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AI Gap Clock

US vs China · measurable AI capacity

Last measuredOct 28, 2026

A public sourced scoreboard of US–China AI capacity — infrastructure, routed demand, and research volume.

Last board update Oct 28, 2026 · Next expected source refresh monthly

Four races, four scoreboards

US on the left, China on the right. They don't add up to a score.

  1. Model quality (Arena)

    As of 22 Oct 2026 (LMArena board)

    Primary

    US leads by 35 points

    US: Gemini 4 Argon (High) · China: MiMo-V2.6-Pro

    USevenChina

    US leads by 35 points · implied ~55% win rate in head-to-head votes

  2. Chip ownership (Epoch, Estimate)

    As of Q4 2025

    Modeled / Estimate

    Five US hyperscalers

    71%

    Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Oracle

    China

    ~5%

    just over 5%

    hyperscalersevenChina

    Hyperscalers ahead

    • Share of AI computing power, not chip count
  3. AI memory (HBM)

    As of Q2 2026

    Primary

    Korea leads, not a US–China race

    Korea 83% · SK Hynix 50% + Samsung 33%

  4. Usage on one public router (OpenRouter tokens)

    As of 27 Oct 2026

    Primary

    US

    28.1%

    China

    66.5%

    USevenChina

    China ahead

    • Unmapped not counted as China
    • day sample, not a census

Four different races. They don't add up to a score. Updated after public releases, not live. Not investment advice.

Primary board

Published figures you can check. Each tile has the last update, one sentence of meaning, and one caveat.

Current · as-of Q2 2026no update since Q2 2026

High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) — memory chips that feed AI accelerators

Tracked revenue for the memory that feeds AI accelerators — a Korea-led supplier story, not a US–China pair and not DRAM.

Korea leads HBMMeasured
KoreaSK Hynix 50% + Samsung 33%83%

HBM rev.As of Q2 2026

United StatesMicron18%

HBM rev.As of Q2 2026

China

not in HBM revenue table

As of Q2 2026

Korea 83%US 18%

Tracked HBM revenue · Korea included

Tracked HBM revenue, shown as published. Not DRAM share.

What this means

A US–China hardware frame misses who can actually ship this memory.

Caveat. China is not in Counterpoint’s HBM revenue table; published shares can sum above 100% due to rounding.

Refreshed monthly after public releases. Counterpoint Research, 2026

Current · as-of 2024no update since 2024

Electricity used by all data centres

Share of electricity used by all data centres in 2024, measured in terawatt-hours (TWh) — not AI halls alone.

US leadsOfficial estimate
United States~180 TWh~45%

of worldAs of 2024

China25%

of worldAs of 2024

Globalall data centres, 2024415

TWhAs of 2024

US 45%China 25%

US vs China only (pairwise)

US vs China only on this bar. All data centres, not AI power.

What this means

A larger US share of that load is a power footprint, not a training-capacity score.

Caveat. The US terawatt-hour figure is the IEA Mid-Year Update companion to the published share.

Refreshed annually after public releases. International Energy Agency, Energy and AI, 2025 · Electricity Mid-Year Update 2025 — demand, 2025

Current · as-of 2024no update since 2024

Talent / top research papers

How many of 2024’s 100 most-cited AI papers were led from the US or from China — papers, not people.

US leadsMeasured
United States46

of top 100As of 2024

China41

of top 100As of 2024

US 52.9%China 47.1%

US vs China only (pairwise)

What this means

The 2021 figure (US 64 / China 33) has narrowed, but the US still leads this elite citation slice.

Earlier figure · 2021. US 64 / China 33 of the top 100. China’s share rose; the US still leads this cut.

Caveat. Stanford AI Index top-100 cut — not a researcher headcount.

Refreshed annually after public releases. Stanford HAI, 2026

Current · as-of CY2025no update since CY2025

Notable new AI models (Epoch’s bar)

Notable 2025 releases that clear Epoch AI’s bar, as counted by the Stanford AI Index — volume, not quality.

US leadsOfficial estimate
United States59

notableAs of CY2025

China35

notableAs of CY2025

US 62.8%China 37.2%

US vs China only (pairwise)

What this means

A higher count is more notable releases, not a better model. See the Arena tile for one public quality yardstick.

Method. The Index reports Epoch AI’s notable-model family — one count, two publishers. Of the 94 US+China notable releases, 59 is 62.8%.

Caveat. The Index reports Epoch AI’s notable-model family — not every public or private model.

Refreshed annually after public releases. Stanford HAI, 2026

Current · as-of 22 Oct 2026 (LMArena board)

Frontier model performance gap (Arena)

Gap in Arena points — a public preference ranking of chat models — between the top US and top Chinese Arena rating on the LMArena text board (overall, raw ratings without style control).

US lead on this boardMeasured · LMArena dataset
US lead22 Oct 2026 (LMArena board)34.6

Arena pointsAs of 22 Oct 2026 (LMArena board)US lead narrowed 6.6 Arena points since 20 Oct

United StatesGemini 4 Argon (High)1,525.7

Arena ratingAs of 22 Oct 2026 (LMArena board)US rating ▼ 6.6 Arena points since 20 Oct

ChinaMiMo-V2.6-Pro1,491.1

Arena ratingAs of 22 Oct 2026 (LMArena board)China rating unchanged since 20 Oct

Hover or tap a point for the date and lead.

0 = tied+50+100+150US aheadChina briefly ahead(Jan–Feb 2025)202420252026
Arena rating lead, top US vs top Chinese model. Higher = US ahead.Raw LMArena ratings without style control; with style control, which Stanford uses, the US stayed about 3–7 points ahead in early 2025.Starts 9 Jan 2024, the first LMArena board with rating ranges and vote counts; earlier boards used an older rating method.Small moves may sit within the confidence interval. Updated after public releases, not live. Source: LMArena.

What this means

On this yardstick the US leads by 35 points, an implied ~55% win rate in head-to-head votes, while chips, memory, and power can still sit far apart.

Earlier figure · 2026 AI Index, March 2026. On LMArena (Stanford used its March 2026 export with style control) the US led by 39 points (1,503 vs 1,464), which Stanford reports as a 2.7% gap (39 points ÷ China's 1,464). Feb 2025: 5 points (0.4%). Different yardstick (2025 Index): end-2023 gaps of 17.5 / 13.5 / 24.3 / 31.6 pts on MMLU, MMMU, MATH, and HumanEval — not this series.

Method. LMArena dataset as republished, current vintage. Text leaderboard, category=overall, raw ratings without style control; best rating per origin; no vote floor. Gemini 4 Argon (High) 1525.7 [1519.2–1532.3] (10,083 votes) vs MiMo-V2.6-Pro 1491.1 [1481.8–1500.4] (4,067 votes). Fetched 28 Oct 2026. Changes use the rounded ratings shown, so they can differ by 0.1 from the archive's unrounded gap. Moves smaller than the bracketed rating ranges above are within LMArena's confidence interval.

Caveat. Arena standing may partly reflect platform adaptation; this is not a live leaderboard.

Fetched 28 Oct 2026.

Refreshed daily after public releases. LMArena, 2026 · Stanford HAI, AI Index Report 2026 — Technical Performance, 2026 · AI Index Report 2025 — Technical Performance, 2025

Current · as-of 27 Oct 2026

Open-market token share (OpenRouter top-models day sample)

Share of tokens — text models read and write — on OpenRouter, a public router. This is routed demand: usage that passed through one marketplace on one day.

China leads this sampleMeasuredOne public router · day sample
United States28.1%

of sampleAs of 27 Oct 2026US share ▼ 0.7 points since 26 Oct

China66.5%

of sampleAs of 27 Oct 2026China share ▼ 0.1 points since 26 Oct

Unmapped / stealthnever counted as China0.7%

of sampleAs of 27 Oct 2026Unmapped unchanged since 26 Oct

China ÷ USmapped China ÷ mapped US

~2.36×

As of 27 Oct 2026China ÷ US ▲ 0.05× since 26 Oct

US 28.1%China 66.5%Unmapped 0.7%Rest 4.7%

OpenRouter top-models day sample — not a census

Unmapped is shown on purpose — a US–China-only bar would hide it.

What this means

China-origin models account for more of the mapped tokens than US-origin models; 0.7% of the sample is unmapped and is not counted as China.

Method. Primary cite: OpenRouter rankings (CC BY 4.0). Rounded from the day-sample extract: US 28.120% → 28.1%, China 66.454% → 66.5%, unmapped 0.702% → 0.7%, China ÷ US 2.3632 → about 2.36×. RoW 4.723% (EU 0.311% folded in) is shown as 4.7% so the bars sum to 100.0.

Caveat. Day sample of OpenRouter’s top models as of 27 Oct 2026. Excludes first-party ChatGPT/Gemini apps and China domestic routers. Unmapped or stealth models stay unmapped.

Refreshed daily after public releases. OpenRouter, 2026

Sources

Public sources only. Continuously displayed. Refreshed after public releases.

Last board update Oct 28, 2026 · Next expected source refresh monthly

  1. Epoch AI, Geopolitics of AI compute (2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  2. Epoch AI, AI Chip Owners Explorer (2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  3. Counterpoint Research, Global DRAM and HBM market share (2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  4. SemiAnalysis, CXMT DRAM / wafer estimate (2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  5. International Energy Agency, Energy and AI (2025)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  6. International Energy Agency, Electricity Mid-Year Update 2025 — demand (2025)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  7. Stanford HAI, AI Index Report 2026 — Research and Development (2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  8. Stanford HAI, AI Index Report 2026 — Technical Performance (2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  9. Stanford HAI, AI Index Report 2025 — Technical Performance (2025)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  10. NIST / U.S. Department of Commerce, CHIPS for America (2022–2026)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  11. State Council of China, National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (Big Fund III) (2024)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  12. Shanghai Municipal Government, National AI Industry Fund announced in Xuhui (2025)

    Last pulled Sep 13, 2026 UTC

  13. OpenRouter, Rankings (top models, day view) (2026)

    Last pulled Oct 28, 2026 UTC

  14. Epoch AI, US vs China frontier gap (Epoch Capabilities Index) (2026)

    Last pulled Oct 5, 2026 UTC

  15. LMArena, leaderboard-dataset (text, overall) (2026)

    Last pulled Oct 28, 2026 UTC

  16. Epoch AI, Epoch Capabilities Index scores (eci_scores.csv) (2026)

    Last pulled Oct 28, 2026 UTC

Sourced scoreboard only. 9 lanes on the board (6 Primary, 3 Estimates) plus companions on HBM wafers and the current ECI point gap — 11 tiles. Dual HBM tiles are one lane, two units (revenue and wafers). The ECI months tile and the ECI point-gap companion are one index, two units. Social posts, forums, blog rankings, and Wikipedia-only cites are not used.

Not the Primary board

Estimates

Modeled figures and packages that are hard to compare. Each tile still has the last update, one sentence of meaning, and one caveat. Not the checkable Primary board.

Current · as-of Q4 2025no update since Q4 2025

Who owns the big AI chips

Modeled share of AI computing power from ownership of leading AI chips at end-2025 — who owns them, not who uses them.

US leadsModeled — Epoch
Five US hyperscalersAmazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Oracle71%

of computing powerAs of Q4 2025

Chinajust over 5%~5%

of computing powerAs of Q4 2025

Five US hyperscalers 71%China ~5%Rest 24%

Share of AI computing power, not chip count.

What this means

A wide ownership gap can sit next to a narrow quality gap.

Caveat. The US figure is five hyperscalers — Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Oracle — not the whole country. Excludes smuggling and offshore cloud.

Refreshed monthly after public releases. Epoch AI, AI Chip Owners Explorer, 2026 · Geopolitics of AI compute, 2026

Current · as-of 2 Jan 2026no update since 2 Jan 2026

Frontier capability gap in months (Epoch Capabilities Index)

Published Epoch finding of how many months China-origin models lagged the US frontier on the Epoch Capabilities Index (ECI), a modeled composite of model capability, since 2023.

Mean China lag since 2023Modeled — Epoch ECI monthsCurrent gap in months not published
Mean China lagsince 20237

ECI monthsAs of 2 Jan 2026

Minimumsince 20234

ECI monthsAs of 2 Jan 2026

Maximumsince 202314

ECI monthsAs of 2 Jan 2026

Current gapsince-2023 range only

not published — not invented

As of 2 Jan 2026

What this means

A modeled time-to-frontier average since 2023 — a different yardstick from the Arena preference ranking, and not a current gap recomputed here.

Method. Mean, minimum, and maximum are the published since-2023 range. This tile does not invent a current gap in months. The current ECI point gap is a second reading, in points.

Caveat. Published insight only (2 Jan 2026). China leaders are often open-weight, so the gap overlaps open versus closed models.

Refreshed annually after public releases. Epoch AI, 2026

Current · as-of 2024–2025no update since 2024–2025

Government industrial packages

Multi-year industrial packages, not yearly AI budgets.

Low–medium comparabilityOfficial estimateNOT COMPARABLE — not an annual AI budget race
United StatesCHIPS (39B mfg + 11B R&D)$50.0B

CHIPSAs of 2024–2025

ChinaNot annualized
  • Big Fund III CNY 344B (~USD 47.5B)
  • AI Industry Fund CNY 60.06B (~USD 8.2B)

As of 2024–2025

What this means

CHIPS and China’s funds buy different things on different clocks; they do not add to a spending race.

Caveat. Do not annualize. The US figure is CHIPS. China’s figures are Big Fund III plus the AI Industry Fund, in yuan.

Refreshed annually after public releases. NIST / U.S. Department of Commerce, 2022–2026 · State Council of China, 2024 · Shanghai Municipal Government, 2025

Current · as-of 2025no update since 2025

HBM wafer supply (estimate)

A modeled wafer share — not HBM revenue.

Modeled

SemiAnalysis: CXMT ~1% of global HBM wafer supply, 2025.

What this means

An estimate of who is cutting wafers, not a seat at the revenue table.

Caveat. A different unit from the revenue table, and never shown beside those shares.

Refreshed annually after public releases. SemiAnalysis, 2026

Current · as-of 15 Oct 2026US–China gap unchanged since 12 Oct

Current ECI point gap

Best US minus best China ECI among models released on or before the latest scored release — ECI points, not months.

Modeled · Epoch ECI points

Current ECI point gap: US +11.0 ECI points (latest model release 15 Oct 2026; Claude Opus 5.5 vs Kimi K3)

What this means

A current point gap on Epoch's index — not the published 7-month average, and not the Arena preference ranking.

Method. The 12 Oct prior is the same Epoch file at an earlier cut-off date.

Caveat. Epoch re-fits ECI, so past points can be restated. eci_scores.csv has no Last-Modified header; the file sha256 is the vintage. This is not a gap in months.

Fetched 28 Oct 2026.

Refreshed daily after public releases. Epoch AI, 2026

Recent releases

Primary documents that moved a metric — not a news feed.

  1. OpenRouter rankings — top-models day sample (token share) · OpenRouter

  2. CHIPS R&D award to Anderon finalized · NIST / U.S. Department of Commerce

  3. CHIPS R&D award to GlobalFoundries finalized · NIST / U.S. Department of Commerce

  4. United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, 2025 update · DOE / Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

  5. Key Questions on Energy and AI · International Energy Agency

  6. 2026 AI Index Report · Stanford HAI

  7. AI Chip Owners Explorer · Epoch AI

  8. US vs China frontier gap on the Epoch Capabilities Index · Epoch AI

  9. National AI Industry Fund announced in Xuhui · Shanghai Municipal Government